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DEFENSE SPENDING AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: 
HOW MUCH CHANGE IS IN THE OFFING? 
by Murray Weidenbaum 
Fads and fashions are not limited to the retail sector of the economy. In recent 
years, many analysts have bemoaned the heavy burden of military expenditures borne by 
the American economy. In contrast, more recent events have generated a growing feeling 
that a generous peace dividend could finance all sorts of "unmet" social needs. Some 
perspective is very much needed in order to contain any impending shift from gloom to 
euphoria. 
Back in 1987, Paul Kennedy of Yale warned that too large a proportion of a 
nation's resources allocated to military purposes likely would lead to "a weakening of 
national power over the longer run."1 Former Senator J. William Fulbright seemed to 
believe that the United States had already attained that sad state. In early 1989, he wrote 
that the United States had "become a militarized economy."2 By December 1989, 
Professor Seymour Melman of Columbia University was renewing his perennial plea to 
convert a military establishment that was the reason the United States is "no longer a first-
class industrial economy ... ..3 
This paper examines the changing role of defense in the American economy in an 
effort to shed some light on the emerging debate on "peace dividends," "conversion," etc. 
On the basis of a variety of economic and statistical analyses, I arrive at a more modest and 
very different set of conclusions. First of all, the military burden, although significant, has 
been far from overwhelming. In fact, the trend has been downward for decades. Secondly, 
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Meeting of the American Economic Association in Atlanta, December 28, 1989. This 
paper draws on a larger study of the political economy of defense being performed under 
the auspices of the Twentieth Century Fund. The author is indebted to Mark Jensen for 
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the reductions now contemplated would be merely an acceleration of that negative sloping 
trend line. Surely, economic adjustments to the contemplated changes in defense spending 
are likely to be modest -- both in terms of dislocation to be suffered and opportunity to 
redirect the nation's resources. 
In order to increase the factual foundation of the emerging debate, let us begin by 
measuring changes in the size of the defense sector and its use of key national resources. 
Let us also address several related points: What is the opportunity cost of defense 
spending? How much defense can we afford? How much do we need to assure national 
prosperity? Can we afford to cut more? The paper concludes with some observations on 
the relationship between defense spending and the national security. 
Measurin~ the Defense Sector4 
There is no generally agreed upon method of measuring the burden of military 
spending on the economy, in part because many of the items purchased by the military 
establishment are so different from the typical civilian marketbasket. Supersonic fighter 
aircraft, nuclear powered submarines, aircraft carriers, and ICBMs have few commercial 
counterparts. We do know that today's large defense sector has consumed many times the 
resources of the U.S. military effort in World War II, although at a much slower pace. 
In absolute terms, the outlays of the Defense Department are huge, totaling $293 
billion in the fiscal year 1989. That sum exceeds the combined sales of General Motors, 
Exxon, and IBM. The DOD budget is greater than the Gross National Product of 
Australia or India or the Netherlands. The defense sector of the GNP is of generally 
comparable magnitude to the military budget and fluctuates along a very similar trend line. 
Aside from some timing adjustments, the entry in the national income accounts is a bit 
smaller because it excludes transfer payments to military retirees and purchases of land 
and other existing assets. 
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( The most widely used measure of the military role in the economy is the ratio of 
defense spending to GNP. For the United States, that ratio is now approximately 6 
percent. Depending on the analyst's policy preference, it can be shown that the ratio is up 
or down from some earlier base. For example, defense spending now is a larger fraction of 
GNP than it was during the Carter Administration when it reached a low of 4.8 percent. 
The ratio today, however, is much lower than during the Kennedy period, when it attained 
a peak of over 9 percent. 
In any event, U.S. defense spending has been expanding in absolute size over the 
past century. From about $1 billion in 1938, the outlays of the Department of Defense rose 
to $293 billion in the fiscal year 1989, or at a compound annual growth rate of 12 percent. 
That was a far more rapid increase than occurred in the population of the country ( 1 
percent) and the rate of inflation (5 percent for the GNP deflator). Because the overall 
economy was expanding during the same period, it is more helpful to focus on the changing 
relative position of military outlays •• especially for the postwar period. 
The most revealing fact that emerges from the historical record is that the relative 
importance of defense to the American economy has followed a declining trend line since 
the end of World War IT, when defense spending reached a record peak of 39 percent of 
GNP. To be sure, the pattern since then has been uneven. But each peak since has been 
progressively lower·· the Korean War, 14 percent; the Vietnam War, 10 percent; the 
Reagan buildup, 6-1/2 percent. 
The same generally downward trend is visible when we compare each successive 
interwar period. Thus, in the years following World War IT and before the Korean conflict, 
defense spending peaked at 10 percent of GNP. Following the Korean War and before the 
Vietnam War, the ratio reached a high of 9 percent. After the Vietnam conflict and before 
the Reagan buildup, the ratio of defense to GNP peaked at 7 percent. Likewise, each 
successive valley was lower than the previous one. 
3 
.. 
( Very recently, a combination of domestic fiscal pressures and international political 
developments has accentuated this downward pattern. The point being made here is that 
the current budget-cutting mood is not an abrupt change but merely an intensification of an 
ongoing trend. 
A generally negatively sloping trend is also evident when we compare the military's 
use of key resources. The Department of Defense's share of the nation's labor force ( 1.3 
percent) in the fiscal year 1989 was lower than it was in any other year since World War II. 
The trend of the military share of research and development is also negatively 
sloping over the same period, despite a modest upturn in the 1980s. The current ratio of 
30 percent is less than half of the 1960 figure of 62 percent. A strategic but overlooked 
development occurred in the 1980s. The private sector replaced the public sector as the 
primary source of sponsorship and funding of the nation's R & D. 
Likewise, the military share of the federal budget is down very substantially -- from 
almost 70 percent in the early 1950s to less than 26 percent today. This contradicts the 
notion that "half of all federal tax dollars go to the Pentagon.~ 
If, to use Senator Fulbright's dramatic term, the United States has become a 
militarized economy, it appears that the worst is behind us. The civilian influences are not 
only greater, but they are rising more rapidly. If we refer to Paul Kennedy's truism that 
allocating too large a proportion of our resources to defense weakens national power, 
perhaps that allocation has not been "too large." In any event, the current outlook is for 
that allocation to continue to shrink. 
The Qpportunity Cost of Defense 
Whatever their specific size, the resources allocated to national defense are not 
available for civilian purposes. In an economy close to effective full employment, it is 
reasonable to assume that, in the absence of the military's demand, much of those 
resources would have gone to meet civilian needs. The question then arises as to which 
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( areas of the civilian economy have yielded those resources -- and, also which areas of the 
economy likely would be able to claim those resources following a reduction in military 
budgets. That- is, what is the "opportunity cost" of defense spending, viewed in terms of 
foregoing the opportunity to use the people, machinery, and materials in some other ways? 
Economists have been considering for some time whether or not increases in 
defense spending come primarily out of resources that otherwise would be devoted to 
investment and, hence, would contnbute to economic growth far more directly. To the 
extent that such is the case, the opportunity cost of defense spending is higher than if the 
money would otherwise go for current consumption -- for items that generate little or no 
future benefit (although the importance of consumption as the end product of economic 
activity should not be ignored). 
The likelihood that defense demands substantially crowd out private investment 
rests in good measure on the notion that a large and growing federal deficit forces the 
Treasury to expand its presence in capital markets. This puts upward pressure on interest 
rates. Rising interest rates, in tum, inlubit private capital formation. Intuitively, it would 
seem that the expanding deficits that so often accompany a military buildup are a factor in 
rising interest rates. However, the empirical evidence on the causal relationship between 
budget deficits and interest rates is not very impressive.6 
As would be expected, during World War II, when the U.S. economy was pushing 
very hard against the limits of productive capacity, the rapid expansion of military demand 
had a strong negative effect on investment. But studies of broader and more recent time 
periods come up with very different results. 
Hollenhorst and Ault examined the period 1939 to 1968. They concluded that 
during peacetime years as well as during the Korean War the only sector of the economy 
significantly affected by defense was non-residential construction; the relationship was 
positive? When we consider that the great bulk of military equipment is produced in 
privately-constructed facilities, that result is not too surprising. The military accelerator 
5 
was at work; the expansion in the demand for weapons production increased the need for 
new factories and equipment to produce them. 
In analyzing the period 1959-68, Bruce Russett found that much of the increase in 
defense spending came out of consumption. Yet, he also showed that a significant portion 
displaced business investment. In reporting on data for 1939-68, he sharpened his 
conclusion: " ... in general, the American experience has been that the consumer pays 
most. Guns do come at the expense ofbutter."8 
Extending Russett's methodology through 1988, his earlier conclusion seems to be 
the more appropriate one. We found that consumption continues to bear the burden of 
changes in defense expenditures (37 percent of the total), followed closely, however, by 
fixed investment (31 percent). 
Kenneth Boulding also studied the opportunity cost of defense for the years 1929 to 
1969. He showed that, in most cases, increases in the share of GNP devoted to defense 
were accompanied by major reductions in the proportion going to consumption. 9 This 
conclusion continued to hold when we extended his analysis to cover the years through 
1988. More recently, Aschauer's study of the impact of aggregate government spending 
reported a very substantial substitution for private consumer expenditure, especially on 
nondurables and services.10 I suggest that the substantial rise in personal income and 
employment tax collections in the period since World War II helps to explain shifts from 
consumption outlays to government purchases. 
A related aspect of the opportunity cost debate is the widespread belief that 
military spending on research and development "crowds out" civilian R & 0.11 The 
available data do not support this view. Over the last three decades and more, changes in 
military R & D and in civilian R & D outlays are just as likely to be in the same direction 
as in opposite directions. A "scatter diagram" (see Figure 1) does not show an inverse 
relationship between movements in military and civilian R & D. 
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Figure 1 
Relation Between Military and Civillan 
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( The same conclusion is reached for the 39 years between 1949 and 1988, the period 
for which detailed budgetary data are available on the shares of the federal budget devoted 
to civilian R & D and to military R & D. The respective shares moved in the same 
direction during 18 of those years and in opposite directions during 16. During five other 
years, the civilian R & D sector registered no change in its portion of the federal budget.12 
There are several possible reasons for these results. Trends in both military and 
civilian R & D may be influenced by a common set of factors, such as changes in society's 
general desire to promote science and technology. Secondly, nondefense and defense 
engineers and scientists are not perfect substitutes. Specialization is great and 
interdisciplinary mobility is low. Thirdly, the supply of scientists and engineers is not fixed. 
It responds to variations in job opportunities, migration, and pay. Defense demand for 
scientists and engineers often has stimulated increases in the output of educational 
institutions that produce people with those skills.13 
In a broader way of looking at the question of economic impacts, Americans often 
have an ambivalent attitude toward the value of defense expenditures. We simultaneously 
view the military use of resources as a burden to the nation, and as a prop to whole 
industries and regions. I can cite from personal experience the frustration of dealing with 
members of Congress who, in public, advocate large reductions in military spending and 
the next day come to the White House in a frantic but private effort to "save" the weapon 
systems being produced in their districts. 
Part of the problem is that what passes for benefit/ cost analysis in the political 
sphere is usually done from a local rather than a national perspective. Try closing any 
unneeded defense base •• or reducing the numbers of aircraft or missiles being purchased. 
The overwhelmingly negative public reaction will quickly demonstrate the point that the 
political process gives the benefits to the locality far greater weight than the costs borne by 
the rest of the nation. This helps to explain why, at least in modem times, Congress has 
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( not cancelled the production of a single weapon system, despite the volume of debate on 
military waste in committee hearings and in the Congressional Record. 
At this point, let us tum to the policy-related questions of how much defense 
spending the American economy can afford or needs. 
How Much Defense Can We Afford? 
Most economists who have studied these matters have arrived at similar answers. 
Can we afford to spend more on defense if we need to? "Yes." Do we need to continue 
the current level of defense spending in order to maintain economic prosperity? "No." 
Some embellishment is in order, however. 
These conclusions are a by-product of work that originated in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s on the economics of disarmament, when military spending was a much larger 
share of the U.S. GNP. For example, the Committee for Economic Development 
concluded in 1958 that the risk that defense spending of 15 percent or more of the GNP 
''will ruin the American way of life is slight indeed."14 
In 1963, when military expenditures were running about 10 percent of GNP, 
Edward Mason wrote that "many foolish words are spoken or written on this subject .... It 
is said that if we increase this percentage significantly the United States will go bankrupt .. 
. . " Mason noted that the effective limit to maintaining a high level of defense spending 
was political. He concluded that" ... there is not much doubt that in the face of deepening 
emergency even higher expenditures would be accepted."15 
As a practical matter, it seems that Mason is right. The pertinent question in 
current debates on defense spending is not the ability of the U.S. economy to produce 
defense goods and services, but the willingness of society to devote a substantial share of its 
resources to that purpose. As Herbert Stein has written more recently, rather than talking 
about being unable to afford a larger defense program, people should be saying that they 
prefer some other use of the national output, such as private consumption or investment.16 
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A recurring concern is that a military buildup may be inflationary. I am in the 
seemingly awkward position of having been on both sides of that debate. In early 1966, I 
sounded the alarm on the inflationary potential of the Vietnam buildup. Yet in 1981, I 
maintained that the Reagan buildup would not be intlationary.17 
What did happen? Recent history shows that a rapid expansion in military demand 
can indeed generate strong inflationary pressures. U.S. participation in the Vietnam War 
furnished a cogent example of a rapid rise in military procurement simultaneous with an 
upsurge in inflation. On the other hand, rapid expansion of defense spending in the early 
1980s was accompanied by a very substantial reduction in the rate of inflation. 
The key difference between the two periods was in monetary policy. Responding to 
strong pressure from President Lyndon Johnson (the chairman of the Fed was summoned 
to "the ranch"), the Federal Reserve in 1965 began to accommodate the expansion of 
federal deficit spending. In contrast, in 1981 the Reagan Administration supported the 
Federal Reserve's efforts to slow down the growth in the money supply simultaneous with 
the military buildup taking place. The contrasting results of these two periods demonstrate 
once again that inflation is primarily a monetary phenomonen and that any link to a 
military buildup is indirect at best. 
The same studies that show that the American economy can handle a much higher 
level of military spending also conclude that the growth and prosperity of the United States 
do not require the current high level of national security expenditure. The Presidential 
Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament, chaired by Gardner 
Ackley, reported in 1965 that, "Experience testifies to the ability of the American economy 
to adjust successfully to major reductions in defense expenditures."18 The Ackley 
committee drew on the adjustment experiences following World War II and the Korean 
War. The post-Vietnam adjustment furnished another case in point. 
In a variety of econometric simulations, Lawrence Klein and Kei Mori estimated 
that a short transition would occur after a large cutback in defense spending. Temporarily, 
10 
( unemployment would rise and the economy's growth rate would slow down. Subsequently, 
however, the peacetime economy would follow a more rapid long run growth path. 19 More 
recent analyses by DRI have yielded basically similar conclusions concerning Secretary of 
Defense Dick Cheney's potential reduction of $180 billion in the defense budget over the 
next five years--" ... the national economy can cope with this transition without major 
problems . ..20 
Indeed, that has been the experience in the recent past. Following an initial 
adjustment period --with its attendant pain and uncertainty -- most localities tend to wind 
up with a stronger economy after the defense cut. A study of 100 former military bases 
reported that, during the period 1981-86, 128,000 new civilian jobs replaced the 93,000 
military jobs at the time when the bases were still operating. This 7 percent average annual 
increase in employment at these sites during the period surveyed compares favorably to the 
average annual increase of 2 percent in employment nationally. Three-fourths of the 
closed bases became industrial and office parks. Most of the remainder house colleges and 
vocational technical schools.21 
Thus, the generally accepted belief among economists - a belief not as universally 
accepted by policymakers -- is that, given a reasonable period of adjustment and following 
policies familiar to most students of Economics 101, the American economy could attain 
prosperity with a defense establishment greatly reduced from the present level. 
At a more microeconomic leve~ the occupations, industries and regions benefiting 
from the changes in sectoral demands likely would be different from those that participated 
most actively in the military buildup. On the basis of past experience, a geographic shift in 
income and employment could be expected to occur, from the aerospace and electronics 
companies on the West Coast and New England to the more conventional industries in the 
midwest. 
11 
Some Conclusions 
There surely is no continuing correct share of GNP that should be allocated to 
defense. The ratio that exists at any time is the accidental result of the federal government 
responding to a variety of internal and external pressures. A high or even rapidly rising 
level of defense spending does not necessarily mean that a nation is becoming more secure. 
Likewise, attaining a share of GNP achieved during an earlier period is no measure of the 
adequacy of defense. The base period used for comparison may have been lower or higher 
than that required for sustaining a given level of military strength. 
As we have been reminded so recently, an interdependence exists with the defense 
outlays of other countries, both antagonists and allies. A carefully constructed program of 
mutual arms reduction could well result in enhancing the sense of security of both the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Nor does increasing the efficiency with which we use 
military resources (getting more bang per buck) necessarily mean that the Pentagon's 
budget can be cut if a potential enemy is simultaneously increasing its military efficiency 
(achieving more rubble per ruble). 
However, higher levels of defense expenditure may not equal expansion in military 
strength because some spending literally goes down the drain. Highly publicized cases of 
$600 toilet seats are exercises in cheap (but effective) politics rather than examples of 
costly procurement. After all, airlines pay as much for similar pieces of equipment. 
Far more important are the billions of dollars that are spent for programs that 
subsequently are cancelled. Between 1957 and 1970, 81 military projects were terminated 
after a total of $12 billion had been spent on them. More recently, approximately $4 billion 
was expended on the development of the Sergeant York anti-aircraft gun before the 
Defense Department terminated the project. 
To return to the point made at the outset of this paper: the defense program is a 
relatively minor player in the American economy -- accounting for one-fifteenth of the 
GNP and an even smaller proportion of the nation's work force. Moreover, the ongoing 
12 
,• 
( 
debate on the proper future levels of defense spending should start off with the knowledge 
that the economic importance of defense in the United States has been declining for many 
years. Economic activity in the United States marches essentially to the beat of civilian 
drummers. The massive economy of the United States is neither propelled nor redirected 
by modest shifts in the relatively small share of GNP devoted to military purposes. 
Furthermore, its powers of adjustment are substantial 
Any consideration of the economic policy responses to further reductions in 
defense spending should take account of the fact that the ability of an economy to adjust to 
shifts in economic forces is greater in the long run than in the short run. The reaction of 
the American economy to the sharp run up in oil prices in the 1970s furnishes a good 
example. The initial responses - both in the public and private sectors -- often bordered 
on panic. Fifteen years after the initial shock, the United States has adjusted fairly well to 
much higher levels of energy prices, in the process becoming a less energy-intensive society. 
Similarly, the initial responses to cancellations of military programs can be painful 
to individual companies, their employees, and the surrounding communities. But, with the 
protection of a social safety net, resources will shift to civilian uses, although not 
necessarily in the same location. In the longer run, decisions by business firms, consumers, 
and investors can be expected to accommodate to the revised pattern of demand -- unless 
government has stepped in with a misguided effort to prevent change. 
Moreover, the adjustments required by defense cutbacks are not basically 
differences from the responses that occur regularly from shifts in consumer demand or 
from technological changes which yield new products that eliminate markets for older 
products, or from changes in the pattern of foreign trade. As the Ackley committee noted, 
" ... major readjustments in the use of resources do continually occur in a free economy 
and, on the whole, fairly successfully . ..22 
Unfortunately, the enthusiasts for an ambitious federally-directed "conversion" 
effort overlook the sad experience of such undertakings in the past. When the major 
13 
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( defense contractors stick close to the products and markets they know, they tend to do well. 
Two notable examples are building civilian space systems for NASA and producing jet 
airline equipment for the commercial carriers. 
But the diversification efforts of major defense contractors into other fields -- both 
in the public and private sectors - have in the main been unsuccessful.23 In a period of 
budget stringency, there is no compelling case for devoting public resources to force 
feeding such "conversion" efforts. Nor is it obvious why public policy should interfere with 
the voluntary shift of resources to other sectors of the economy. Indeed, a large reduction 
in defense spending -- and a concomitant reduction in federal deficit financing -- should be 
expected to be a welcome opportunity for increasing the extent to which consumers, 
producers, and investors make their own decisions on the use of their income and wealth. 
In any event, for the range of likely disagreements about the future size and 
composition of the military budget, economic constraints are not likely to be particularly 
binding. It would be unfortunate if political pressures instituted such constraints, especially 
on the basis of misreading economic analysis. This is not a plea for adopting any particular 
level of military outlays. Rather, the amount of resources that the United States devotes to 
the defense establishment should be determined on political-- that is, essentially national 
security -- grounds, with due regard to the pressures of competition from other demands 
on the public purse. 
14 
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